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MINIMUM COMPETENCY TESTING-REDUNDANCY
OR NECESSITY? AN ANALYSIS OF THE EDUCATIONAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES
T HE TAXPAYER revolt which characterized the 1970s has finally hit the
schools. Taxpayer outrage over paying for what has been perceived as
grossly inadequate education has culminated in a demand for public
education that does what it is supposed to do: provide the students with
an education. At a minimum, taxpayers and parents are demanding that
students graduate from high school with the ability to read, write, and do
simple arithmetic. Taxpayers and private donors are understandably upset
when their contributions to higher education are spent teaching college
students to read and write.' In addition, there is an "increasing scarcity of
jobs which do not require proficiency in reading, writing, and arithmetic. 2
For example, "manuals for Army cooks require an eighth- or ninth-grade
reading level, and instructional manuals for mechanics in the Navy and
Air Force require at least an eleventh- or twelfth-grade level . . .,,
Many high school graduates would not qualify for these jobs. One
author asked some high school teachers and principals what level of
school work they could guarantee that 97% of all graduates could do. They
answered, "Well, first grade work; maybe second grade."4 This low level of
capability after twelve years of public education causes citizens to complain
about students being passed from grade to grade (social promotion) and
eventually graduating just for putting in "seat time."5 The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare has "concluded that an estimated one
million American youths, twelve to seventeen years old, probably could
not read as well as the average fourth grader, and thus they could be
called illiterate."6
I Hechinger, The Back-To-the-Basics Impact, TODAY'S EDUCATION 31 (Feb.-Mar. 1978).
2 Id.
8 Chall, Minimum Competency in Reading: An Informal Survey of the States, 60 Pi DELTA
KAPPAN 351, 352 (Jan. 1979).
4 Brickell, Seven Key Notes on Minimum Competency Testing, 59 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 589.
591 (May 1978).
5 One teacher reports:
[i]n my first year of teaching I used a standard textbook to teach a senior geography
class. About one-fifth of my students did not know how to read. They could not handle
the work; therefore, I could not in good conscience give them a passing grade. Yet
these students were high school seniors, and I did not want to be responsible single-
handedly for preventing them from graduating. I asked some senior faculty members
what I should do. They explained that if a student came to class and was not disruptive,
he or she was to receive a passing grade.
Hart, The California Pupil Proficiency Law As Viewed by Its Author, 59 PM DELTA KAPPAN
592 (May 1978).. ... •
6 U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, LITERACY AMONo YouTHs 12-17 YE.us
3 (1973), cited in McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues,
47 FoRDHAM L. REv. 651, 653 (1979).
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The legislative response to these and similar findings has been swift,
complex, and overwhelming in its variety. The most common response has
been to enact competency testing statutes, euphemistically entitled edu-
cational accountability or assessment acts, or mastery learning programs.
Four years ago these tests were unheard of; now, according to some com-
mentators, every state has adopted or discussed some sort of minimum
competency program.' Estimates of the number of state statutes and reso-
lutions vary with each article that has been written about them. Undoubtedly
by the time this commentary is read for the first time, some of the legis-
lation it contains and refers to will be out of date. "The push for minimum
competency testing ... [i]n 1976 and 1977... could only be described
as 'fast moving.' Sweeping concepts were included in one-page bills; state
board mandates were often short paragraphs asking local districts.., to
'implement a full-scale program' sometimes very quickly."' Public reaction
(except perhaps that of failing students and their parents) has overwhelm-
ingly favored competency testing plans. Sixty-five percent of those surveyed
in a 1976 Gallup Poll answered "yes" when asked whether "all high school
students... [should] be required to pass a standard nationwide examination
in order to get a high school diploma."9 "The minimum competency testing
movement is clearly being led, or pushed, by noneducators." 1°
This article will discuss the pros and cons of the movement, first
from an educational viewpoint, then from a legal perspective, touching on
some current state plans and programs and offering suggestions and con-
clusions."
The widely publicized Adult Performance Level (APL) Study ...found that on over-
all competency performance, . . . 19.7% of the population could be classified as
'functionally incompetent' or 'adults who function with difficulty.' 33.9% could be
classified as 'functional adults,' and 46.3% could be classified as 'proficient adults.'
'Overall, approximately one-fifth of U.S. adults are functioning with difficulty.'
UNIVERSrrY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, ADULT FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCY: A SuMMARy (1975),
cited in McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 651, 654 (1979).
' Pipho, Minimum Competency Testing in 1978: A Look at State Standards, 59 Pm DELTA
KAPPAN, 585 (May 1978); Pipho, Minimum Competency Standards, Today's Education, 34,
35 (Feb.-Mar. 1978). See Appendix A comparing state minimum competency testing
statutes.
a Pipho, Minimum Competency Testing in 1978: A Look at State Standards, 59 PM DELTA
KAPPAN 585 (May 1978).
9 Hart, supra note 5, at 592.
10 Pipho, supra note 8, at 586.
11 In order to narrow somewhat the scope of this comment, the issues unique to competency
testing of handicapped students have been omitted. See generally, McClung, Competency
Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 FoRDAm, L. REV. 651, 698, 701 (1979).
Likewise, issues relating to testing teacher competency have not been discussed. See generally,
Pipho, supra note 8, at 587.In addition, the reader may be interested in a development so recent it was not in-
cluded herein. A case very similar to Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (1979) was
filed in North Carolina in May of 1980. Iwanda H. v. Berry, No. CC 80-0156 (W.D.N.C.,
Charlotte Div., complaint and motion for preliminary injunction filed 5/2/80). A short
[Vol. 15:1
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/6
THE EDUCATORS' VIEWPOINT
First of all, what is a minimum competency test? It is "a standardized
examination designed to demonstrate whether a student has reached a
given level of proficiency in any one of several basic academic skills re-
quired to function in everyday adult life."12 Similarly, minimum competency
testing is "a program in which students are tested to determine their mastery
of certain skills defined as essential aspects of school learning or essential
aspects of school learning or essential for performing tasks routinely con-
fronted in adult life."'"
These definitions demonstrate the first basic point on which the various
state statutes differ. Should the students be tested on basic academic skills,
or on life skills, necessary to function in society?
An item testing academic skills may require the student to simply add
a series of numbers or correct a grammatical error;' life skills questions
test more practical skills such as reading a newspaper, balancing a check-
book, or preparing a tax form. 5 "The [academic skills] ... item will indicate
whether the student is ready for the next course in school; the
[life skills question] . . . will indicate whether the student is ready
for the shopping center. Both are important,"'" but schools cannot
discussion of this case may be found in THE EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES LAW
AND EDUCATION CENTER, FOOTNOTES No. 25 (June 1980).
12 Lewis, Certifying Functional Literacy: Competency Testing and Implications for Due
Process and Equal Educational Opportunity, 8 J.L. AND EDUC. 145, 146 (1979).
28 RAMSBOTHAM, THE STATUS OF MINIMUM COMPETENCY PROGRAMS IN TWELVE SOUTHERN
STATES: A SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM REPORT 123 (1980) (glossary)
[hereinafter cited as SEPEP REPORT].
14 A school skills question might resemble this one from the Denver Proficiency and Review
Test:





The correct answer is:
(A) 2568, (B) 2569, (C) 2659, (D) 2669, (E) NONE.
quoted in Lewis, supra note 12, at 146, n. 10.
15 A life skills question, might read:
A warning on a medicine label may read: Severe sore throat or sore throat accompanied
by fever, headache, nausea, or vomiting may be serious. Consult a physician immedi-
ately. If rash or irritation develops stop using and consult a physician. Do not use more
than 5 days or give to children under 3 years of age unless directed by physician.
According to the label, if you have a sore throat, fever, and a headache, you should
(A) use the medicine for 5 days
(B) call a doctor as soon as you can
(C) increase the amount of medicine you take
(D) use other medication to cure the fever and headache.
Example designed by the Educational Testing Service, included in AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, A CrrIZEN's INTRODUCTION TO MINIMUM COMPETENCY PROGRAMS
FOR STUDENTS 12-13 (1978), quoted in Lewis, supra note 12, at 146, n.10.
16 Brickell, supra note 4, at 589.
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test all skills at all grades; the cost is prohibitive." For this reason, different
testing combinations have been proposed: "school skills for the college-
bound and life skills for the job-bound... school skills for promotion to
the next grade and life skills for graduation from school."'s
Although "[t]he public is apparently concerned with poor student
performance on the job,"'" academic skills, rather than life skills, are usually
taught in the schools.21 "The assumption appears to be that school skills-
reading, writing, and arithmetic-will make an automatic transfer to on-
the-job skills."21 Thus, some educators believe that
a student with basic literacy skills will have no difficulty passing an
adult-life skills test even if he or she has not been exposed to adult-
life skills in the classroom. They argue that students who can add and
subtract a series of four-digit numbers on a basic numeracy skills
test item, for example, will be able to do the same in the context of
a tax form on an adult-life skills test. However, many students... will
have difficulty with the kind of transference skills called for in an
adult-life skills item... Therefore, school districts that plan to test
for adult skills should have curricula and instruction that emphasize
transference as well as the other knowledge and skills necessary to
answer the adult-life skills items.22
Furthermore, an adult-life skills item such as a tax form is "more
difficult than its basic numeracy components [partially because] ... (1) the
17 Even without taking into consideration the cost of remedial programs, additional ad-
ministrators, legal fees, enforcement costs, and auditing and checking expenses, one author
has estimated that the set-up costs, including studies and data collecting, are likely to be
"in the neighborhood of $50,000" for one year with only one staff member working on the
project. Anderson & Lesser, The Costs of Legislated Minimum Competency Requirements.
59 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 606 (May 1978).
The implementation costs ("information about the effects, . . . pilot testing, . . . mod-
el[s] . . . of the financial impact . . . administrative, record keeping, and reporting ex-
penses") will total an estimated $51,500 to $198,200. Id. at 606-07.
'The cost of test development-the writing of items, pilot testing, revising . . . runs
from $25 to $210 per item .... [Thus if] only 10 criteria are to be measured, and...
only 10 items are required to measure each criterion . . . [to measure three times] test
development costs will run between $15,000 and $63,000 . . ." Id. at 607.
The work of printing, mailing, scoring, and reporting results . . . can be done for
between 50 cents and $1.55 per student, assuming that classroom teachers administer
the test and that no charge is made for their time. States using contractors for test
administration report costs of just under $1 . . . through $13 per student.
Id. These costs were reported in 1978; undoubtedly they have since risen.
Is Brickell, supra note 4, at 589.
29 Pipho, supra note 8, at 586.
20 
"Interest rates, checkbooks, tax forms, etc., were included in the 7-8 grade arithmetic books
in the 40's and 50's but dropped out of sight in the 60's with the advent of modern math."
McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 FoRDHAM L. REv.
651, 685 (1979).
21 Pipho, supra note 8, at 586.
22 McClung, supra note 20, at 684-85.
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forms usually require literacy as well as numeracy skills, and (2) an official
form can be distracting and intimidating. ' '21
Life skills are undoubtetdly important in the real world but perhaps
the schools are not the appropriate places to learn them or to test them. Or
perhaps "paper and pencil" tests are not the best way to test adult life
skills. A practical alternative would be to test life skills in
real-life situations, for example, checking the accuracy of bills and
sales slips, using the public library, using the town and state offices.
'These competencies are most validly measured by the most direct
means possible, situational or performance examinations which de-
termine if the student can actually perform the behaviors.'2"
Admittedly, "direct measurement is often costly and time consuming,"'2
perhaps more so than paper and pencil tests. Yet perhaps a sample of stu-
dents could be directly measured in various life skills to determine whether
or not their paper and pencil performance really is indicative of their
ability to function in those areas; if it is not, the paper and pencil test could
be revised. Similarly, "if a student cannot pass a paper-and-pencil com-
petency test, perhaps that student should be given a direct performance
test to be sure that he or she does not have the requisite skills before
denying him or her a diploma."2"
One educational testing requirement which may steer schools away
from testing life skills is the requirement of instructional match. The basic
rationale behind the requirement is that it is unfair to test a student on
what she has never been taught.27 In other words, the school's curriculum
and instruction must in some way be matched to whatever is to be measured
by the competency test. 8
One author has broken instructional match down into two categories:
curricular validity and instructional validity. "Curricular validity is a
measure of how well test items represent the objectives of the curriculum.
An analysis of curriculum validity would require comparison of the test
objectives with the school's course objectives. ' 9 If the curriculum does not
call for instruction in the objectives which are later tested "failure on the
competency test should reflect on the schools,"' not on the individual pupils.
"Even if the curricular objectives of the school correspond with the com-
23 Id. at 685.
24 Id. at 708 (citing Madam & Airasian, Issues in Evaluating Student Outcomes in Com-
petency-Based Graduation Programs, 10 J. REsEARcH & DEv. EDUC. 79, 86 (1977)).
25 McClung, supra note 20, at 708.
" Id.
27 Lewis, supra note 12, at 160.
28 McChng, supra note 20, at 682.
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petency test objectives, there must be some measure of whether the school's
stated objectives were translated into topics actually taught in the district's
classrooms."' "[I]nstructional validity is an actual measure of whether the
schools are providing students with instruction in the knowledge and skills
measured by the test."3
In addition to curricular and instructional validity, competency tests
should be evaluated to insure predictive validity and content validity. If
a student's score is not an accurate measure of his capacity to function as
an adult, the test does not meet the requirement of predictive validity; 3
it does not predict what it is supposed to predict. Likewise, if a test does
not actually measure what it purports to measure, i.e., it does not indicate
knowledge in the subject it allegedly tests, it does not meet the standards
for content validity.3" The four types of validity are somewhat interrelated,
but a test that meets the requirements for one type of validity may still
fail when tested for another type of validity."
Evaluating a test's validity and match is a technical, time-consuming
and expensive process.3" Yet validity and match are of undeniable impor-
tance. Regardless of what steps are taken to assure validity and instructional
match, "[a] school system that cannot ensure the . . . validity of its com-
petency tests should not use them as a basis for denying promotion or a
diploma to any of its students. 87'
Closely related to validity is the educational concept of reliability.
While "validity demonstrates what may be properly inferred from a test
score,"38 reliability indicates "whether the [test] instrument measures ac-
81 Id. at 682-83 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 683.
" Lewis, supra note 12, at 159-60 and n.11, 111.
34 Id.; McClung, supra note 20, at 683.
35 For example, content validity "does not ensure either curricular or instructional validity."
McClung, supra note 20, at 683.
86 For example, 'It]he cost of a proposed construct validity study for Florida's functional
literacy test was $28,446." Lewis, supra note 12 at 161, n.116.
Construct validity is a measure of how well test items correlate to the theory or con-
structs behind the test . . .. This assessment is probably the most difficult to conduct
since it may be difficult to identify the constructs upon which a test is built and be-
cause a statistical analysis . . . may be required.
McClung, supra note 20, at 667. Any statistical study of a tests validity will be expensive.
The school system may have to balance this cost against the cost to the students' of de-
priving them of a promotion or advancement due to an invalid testing device. See Lewis,
supra note 12, at 160-61.
37 McClung, supra note 20, at 684 (referring only to curricular and instructional validity).
Some schools do not use their competency tests to make promotion or graduation decisions.
See inira notes 59-67 and accompanying text. A test's validity may, in addition, raise certain
questions, especially regarding due process. See inIra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
See McClung, supra note 20, at 666-67 and the materials cited therein for a more detailed
discussion of validity.
ssLewis, supra note 12, at 159,
[Vol. 15:1
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curately what it measures; for example, the instrument should yield com-
parable results when used at different times.""9 That it often does not is
demonstrated by the differing difficulty of test items which were designed
to measure the same objectives. One author has noted that "two people
can look at the same objective and one will write an easy [test] item and the
other will write a hard item.
40
As if questioning a test's reliability, validity, and match was not enough
to boggle the mind of anyone who is not well-versed in educational meas-
urement, educators have also hotly debated the question of whether com-
petency tests should be criterion-referenced or norm-referenced. A criterion-
referenced test is one "on which an individual pupil's performance is inter-
preted in terms of his or her performance on a set of prespecified objectives
or competencies." 1 A norm-referenced test, on the other hand, is one "on
which an individual pupil's performance is interpreted in terms of his or
her standing relative to the performance of other pupils who took the test;42
commonly called grading on a curve.
The fundamental argument against criterion-referenced tests is that
setting a standard against which students will be measured is arbitrary and
authoritarian. "3 The trend, however, seems to be towards favoring criterion-
referenced tests over norm-referenced ones. The National Education As-
sociation has recommended that test items be criterion-referenced" and
several state statutes have mandated it. 5 A practical argument illustrates
the advantage of using a criterion-referenced test:
[tlo establish an arbitrary passing score based on a norm can fail to
39 McClung, supra note at 666, (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsTS (1974)). Federal guidelines often defer to the
APA Standards. Id. at 665.
40 Glass, Minimum Competence and Incompetence in Florida, 59 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 602,
604 (May 1978). For example, two questions from a New Jersey examination
test the objective, 'adding single-digit numbers.' But in one item the digits are arranged
vertically and in the other they are arranged horizontally. Of third-grade pupils, 86%
got the vertical item correct and 46% got the horizontal item correct. [Similarly,]
• .. two items from the Stanford Reading Test that both test the objective. 'The pupil
should be able to discriminate the grapheme combination "vowel + r".'
Item 1): 'Mark the word "firm".' (And the proctor reads 'firm,' 'form,' and 'farm.')
Item 2): 'Mark the word "girl".' (And the proctor reads 'goal,' 'girl,' and 'grill.')
The difficulty for examinees of Item 1 is 56%; for Item 2 it's 88%. Id.
If, in the interest of test security, some students were given all "Item Is" and other
students were tested exclusively on "Item 2s," their pass/fail rates might not be reliable
indicators of their knowledge of the stated objectives.
41 SEPEP REPORT, supra note 13, at 122 (glossary).
42 Id. at 123 (glossary).
43 McClung, supra note 20, at 669 (citing Glass, Minimum Competence and Incompetence
in Florida, 59 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 602, 602-05 (May, 1978) and Glass, Standards and Cri-
teria, 15 J. EDuc. MEASUREMENT 237, 259 (1978)).
4NEA Instruction and Professional Development (Standards), cited in Pipho, Minimum
Competency Standards, TODAY'S EDUCATION 34, 36 (Feb.-Mar. 1978).
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insure mastery by all pupils (when the majority of pupils are deficient
in the basics) or doom some students to failure (when all students
have mastered the skills with insignificant differences in pupil per-
formance) .'I
In other words, if all the student scores are in the 30-40% range out of
a possible 100 points, it can hardly be argued that any of the students
have mastered the objective, yet those at the top of the group would pass
if the test was norm-referenced. Likewise, if the students' scores were all
between 90 and 100%, those at the bottom of the group would fail even
though they would appear to have mastered the skill. "Criterion-referenced
tests . . .overcome such shortcomings by measuring students against ob-
jective standards rather than against themselves.""'
Another decision legislators will have to face when developing an
educational assessment program is whether the tests should be standardized
on a state or local level. The most obvious argument for locally developed
tests is that local school boards have traditionally had jurisdiction to establish
graduation and grade promotion standards." Some legislators "feared
that local governing boards, increasingly sensitive to legislative encroach-
ments, would fight a prepackaged program." ' In addition, "a statewide
test cannot be tailored to the diverse instruction and curricula that has been
offered in local districts, and it will take a number of years for curriculum
and instruction to adapt themselves to the test. 150 Thus it will be more
difficult for a statewide test to meet the requirements of validity and match
discussed earlier.5"
There are, however, many equally valid arguments for setting statewide
standards. First is the advantage of uniformity. Future employers and col-
lege admissions officers would know exactly which competencies had been
measured and mastered and students changing schools would not be con-
fronted with new requirements and standards within the same state.5" Sec-
ondly, "designing a reliable and valid test that meets professional psycho-
metric standards is beyond the expertise . . . of most local districts."' s
A third compelling argument for statewide testing involves the cost
-Hart, supra note 5, at 593.
4 7McClung, supra note 20, at 670 (citing POPHAM, CRITERIoN-REFERENCED MEASUREMENT
(1978)).
48 Pipho, supra note 8, at 586.
49lHart, supra note 5, at 593; see also McClung supra note 20, at 667.
50 McClung, supra note 20, at 668. This raises the "classic controversy about whether tests
should lead or follow curriculum, and whether teachers should 'teach to the test.'" Id.(footnotes omitted). This controversy is about as easily solved as the one which asks,
"Which came first, the chicken or the egg?"51 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
52 McClung, supra note 20, at 667-68.
53 Id. at 668.
[Vol. 15:1
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of developing and implementing a competency testing program. When
multiplied by the number of students in a district, the costs of a testing pro-
gram rapidly become prohibitive." Thus "states that mandate decentralized
programs are also mandating high development costs."5
A related cost, the value of which is not seriously debated, is the
add-on cost of remedial instruction which should be provided when students
fail the tests. Most educators agree that the tests are not of much value if
those who fail are not given remedial instruction. However, "the greatest
cost in competency requirements arises when it becomes obvious that much
remedial work is necessary. 7
Remediation poses another problem for school administrators: "offi-
cials will have to choose between the expense of after-school remedial pro-
grams and the juggling of schedules in regular school hours to provide
other work for students who receive passing marks."58
Some state statutes limit the use of competency test results to identify-
ing those in need of remediation (diagnostic purposes) ;5 others provide that
the tests must be passed as a prerequisite to grade promotion or graduation."0
Arguments for using competency tests as an exit requirement include the
rationale that
sending students into the world without basic skills is a greater dis-
service to them than diploma denial, and that a high school diploma
based on social promotion rather than achievement does not mean
much anyway . . . . Others will not try to minimize the injury of
diploma denial, but will argue that schools have a responsibility to
certify competence for employers, educational institutions and society
at large . . . . [Another] argument is that a serious penalty is neces-
sary to motivate students and teachers. 1
Thus, the argument continues, if legislation did not include an exit sanction,
54See supra note 17 for a discussion of the costs involved in implementing a competency
testing program.
55 Anderson & Lesser, supra note 17, at 607.
56 Lewis, supra note 12, at 152; Mahon, Competency Based Education-What Are the Legal
Issues? 64 NATiONAL ASSOCIATiON OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULLETUN 98 (Feb.
1980).
57 Anderson & Lesser, supra note 17, at 607. According to one author's compilations,
[t]he state of Washington has estimated that its remedial programs-one in math and
one in reading-will require between $43 million and $47 million each. New Jersey ex-
pects its bill for compensatory programs to rise from $30 million in 1976-77 to $70
million in 1978-79. Michigan spends some $28 million and Florida plans to spend $10
million to help students pass competency examinations. A 1972 California report pro-.
posed $500 million for compensatory education. Id.
58 Lewis, supra note 12, at 149, n.31 (quoting The N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1977).
59See, e.g., ARK. STARS. ANN. § 80-155 (1980).
60 See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 51217 (West Supp. 1981).
61 McClung, supra note 20, at 658-659.
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"many school districts would ignore [the law, and] . . . students would
be passed from grade to grade without acquiring the [necessary] skills."62
The strongest objection to using test results as a requirement for
graduation is that "it is the student who suffers .... even if it is really the
teacher or school that is at fault."62 In addition, applying an exit sanction
may cause teachers to "teach to the test" and ignore or neglect subjects the
students will not be tested on or the application of the test subjects to the
real world." This is of special concern in states which allow students to
graduate early if they can pass the proficiency exam." The National Educa-
tion Association has suggested that "in no case will written tests be the sole
criterion for either movement from grade to grade or graduation from second-
ary school.' 'M6 In addition, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., as the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare warned that "[t]ests are tools-not magic wands.
Even with the most sophisticated tests, the assessment of learning will still
require sensitive judgments about a child's human development. Tests can
help inform such judgments; tests cannot make them." '
Before discussing the legal issues surrounding minimum competency
testing, one further issue that will face legislators about to implement an
educational assessment program should be discussed. When making funding
decisions, the legislator's instinctive reaction might be to provide funds
to the districts that appear to need additional help. This need would prob-
ably be manifested in low test scores and relatively high failure rates. One
commentator has pointed out that this approach is totally erroneous and
likely to be counterproductive.
The state agencies . . . should reward good performance .... [Wlhen
poor behavior is given attention it tends to persist.
... They are rewarding poor performance on the part of schools
by providing funds to hire personnel and purchase materials. School
districts that perform well will be denied these benefits. Moreover, once
a school system has become accustomed to these state payments, it
will find it difficult to give them up . . . . If states are going to pro-
vide compensatory education money at all, they should provide it only
to districts that show high levels of achievement."
62 Hart, supra note 5, at 594.
63 Lewis, supra note 12, at 149 (citing Madaus & Airasian, Issues in Evaluating Student
Outcomes In Competency-Based Graduation Programs; 10 J. RESEARCH & DEV. Enuc. 79,
82 (1977)).
'4 SEPEP REPORT, supra note 13, at 130.
65 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CoDE § 48412 (West 1978).
66 NEA Standards, cited in Pipho, Minimum Competency Standards, TODAY'S EDucATION
34, 36 (Feb.-Mar. 1978).
67Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of H.E.W., speaking before the 1977 annual meeting of
the College Entrance Examination Board, quoted in Pipho, Minimum Competency Standards,
TODAY'S EDUCATION 34, 35 (Feb.-Mar. 1978).
68 Anderson & Lesser, supra note 17, at 608.
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Once all of the educational issues have been resolved by the state
legislators and they have decided which combination of the variety of
provisions they wish to adopt in their state and have actually enacted the
law, it might appear that the hardest issues have been resolved and every-
one can sit back and watch the fully competent graduates emerge from
the high schools to be received with open arms by waiting employers and
colleges. "[Plolicy makers may believe that it is sufficient to cause something
to occur by legislating that it should occur. '16 Unfortunately, this may not
be what happens at all. What about the students who have failed the tests and
the parents and community groups who are unhappy with the way the
tests were administered or the way the results were used? Passage of the
statute merely opens the doors to litigation.
Yet, "[c]ourts have traditionally been reluctant to review cases ques-
tioning the adequacy of educational programs or the validity of professional
judgments about academic performance of students"7 due to their extremely
subjective nature.
The counterargument is that competency tests, unlike regular class-
room examinations "are specifically designed to provide relatively objective
criteria for making the crucial evaluation of academic performance.""' In
addition to the greater objectivity of competency tests, the
courts will no longer be faced with a challenge to a graduation decis-
ion based upon 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information' -
that is, hundreds of tests in scores of classes graded by numerous teach-
ers using complex personal mixes of objective and subjective criteria.
Instead, courts will be asked to review. . . a decision based primarily
upon the result of one test instrument purported to incorporate test
items that are objectively related to clearly specified performance ob-
jectives and explicit educational goals. 2
"[T]he barrier of subjectivity is removed. Competency in basic skills, un-
like a student's knowledge of American history, looks more like an as-
certainable fact."7 Thus "the courts' primary rationale for past restraint is
far less persuasive in the [competency testing] . . . situation, and
judicial review is warranted."7"
One claim that may be brought before the courts based on competency
testing programs is that the test itself and/or the manner in which its re-
69Wise, Minimum Competency Testing: Another Case of Hyper-Relationalization, 59 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN, 596, 597 (May 1978).
ToMcClung, supra note 20, at 660-61.
71 ld. at 663.
72 Id.
7a Lewis, supra note 12, at 165.
74 McClung, supra note 20, at 664.
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suits are used by schools violates the fourteenth amendment Due Pro-
cess clause. 5 In Debra P. v. Turlington, the 1979 case which challenged
Florida's functional literacy exit examination, the plaintiffs focused on the
fact that they had not been given adequate notice prior to the implemen-
tation of Florida's functional literacy tests, and that therefore the school
board's schedule of implementation violated their fourteenth amendment
due process right to timely notice. 6
Since a plaintiff's right to due process is protected only when an in-
terest in life, liberty, or property can be identified, the court first consid-
ered whether or not one of these interests was implicated. The court found
that the plaintiffs had "a property right in graduation from high school
with a standard diploma if they have fulfilled the present requirements for
graduation exclusive of the SSAT II requirement. 77 This property interest
arises because the state makes school attendance mandatory; thus "public
education is not a mere 'unilateral expectation' but an understanding be-
tween the state and the student that both are to benefit from compulsory
school attendance: the state by securing an enlightened citizenry, the student
by securing the fundamental prerequisites of economic livelihood ....
[T]he state's role in urging [the attainment of a diploma] create[s] an
entitlement,""8 and thus a property interest of which the plaintiff may not
be deprived without due process.
In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs had "a liberty interest
in being free of the adverse stigma associated with the certificate of com-
pletion,'" a differentiated diploma which Florida gave to students who
had fulfilled the other requirements for graduation, but who had failed the
SSAT II functional literacy exam.
Traditionally, once it is determined that the plaintiff has liberty and
property interests at stake, the court applies a balancing test to determine
what process is due before the state can infringe upon those interests. There
are three factors involved: "First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used; . . . and finally, the Government's
interest, including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute requirement would entail.""0 The Debra P. court
indirectly addressed each of these concerns. The court implied that the
plaintiff interest in receiving a diploma upon fulfillment of the original re-
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
TO 474 F. Supp. 244, 263 (1979).
77Id. at 266 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 491 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
78 Lewis, supra note 12, at 154-55. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
TO Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 266 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
80 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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quirements for graduation was undermined when the school board changed
the requirements for graduation.' As to the second factor, the court pointed
out that the state failed "to carry out equating studies",82 i.e., studies to de-
termine the validity and reliability of the tests."' This seems to indicate a
substantial risk of error implicit in the tests as applied. Studies which might
have disproved this conclusion were not undertaken, thus the court could not
conclude that the risk of error was minimal. The stated interests of the
school board were:
that the momentum, interest, credibility, and support of Florida pub-
lic education now present will be undermined if the Court finds the
test or implementation schedule invalid. The Defendants are further
concerned that they will be without a sanction or deterrent if the
Court voids the linkage of the functional literacy test to the diploma."
But the court did not invalidate the "linkage;" it held only that the im-
plementation schedule as it stood was unconstitutional since it did not
provide sufficient notice before the imposition of the sanction. 5 In granting
injunctive relief, the court made it clear that "[a]t the end of the injunctive
period, the state will be permitted to pursue its educational policies and
goals free of intervention.""
The injunction was granted for two reasons: first, the lack of timely
notice and the consequent deprivation of due process and secondly, be-
cause the system needed time to "purge the taint of past segregation." 8
This was the focus of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Actually,
this claim was a combination of three claims, each with its own statutory or
constitutional support. First, plaintiffs invoked the language of the fourteenth
amendment: "[n]o State shall . . .deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."88 Secondly, the plaintiffs claimed
the protection of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which states that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."8 9 Plaintiff's third focus was on the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act which provides that "[n]o state shall deny
equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
8 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 267 (1979).
82Id.
83 See text accompanying notes 27-40 supra.
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8942 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
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race, color, sex, or national origin, by- . . . (b) the failure of an edu-
cational agency which has formerly practiced . . . deliberate segregation
to take affirmative steps . . . to remove the vestiges of a dual school
system." '
The gist of these three claims is that competency tests unfairly dis-
criminate against black students. "That black youngsters score less suc-
cessfully on standardized test instruments has been widely acknowledged." 1
Under the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution
there are two separate standards, one of which will be applied by the
courts in deciding whether or not a person's equal protection rights have
been violated.92 In the context presented by Debra P., the first standard
holds the plaintiffs to the burden of proving a "discriminatory purpose when
challenging competency testing programs in school districts not recently
desegregated or found to be subject to prior discrimination."9 Typical
factors which "might have probative value in proving intent [include]:
historical background, ... legislative history, and testimony from offi-
cials."" However,
[w]hen . . . [school board] actions have the 'natural probable,
and foreseeable result of increasing or perpetuating segregation,'
a presumption of segregative purpose is created. The burden of proof
then shifts to defendant officials . . . to demonstrate that no reason-
able alternative policy would have achieved the same permissible
educational goals with less segregative effect." 5
In deciding Debra P., the court really did not have to reach the issue of
intent to discriminate since the case actually fits into the second subcategory
9020 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
-' Lewis, supra note 12, at 166. See graph comparing the scores of black and white students
in Florida, at Appendix B. The fact that "historically black children have not fared well on
standardized tests in Florida schools" was stipulated in Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F.
Supp. 244, 249 (1979).
92 In Debra P., the court does not discuss the fourteenth amendment equal protection claim,
the Title VI claim and the Equal Educational Opportunity claim individually. Actually, the
opinion blurs the distinction between the claims and particularly between the two sub-
categories of equal protection, one of which requires a demonstration of intent or purposeful
discrimination, and the other under which a showing of discriminatory effect or impact
is sufficient. The law review articles which will be relied on are much more effective in
providing guidelines for future equal protection claims in the competency testing context.
As a matter of fact, the Lewis article, supra note 12, and the McClung article, supra
note 20, as well as others, are cited in Debra P. as having been "of considerable assistance"
to the court. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 253 n.17 (1979).
93 McClung, supra note 20, at 690 (emphasis added).
04 Id.
9 5 Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978)
(emphasis added); McClung, supra note 20, at 690. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("For normally the actor is presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his deeds."); United States v. Texas Educational Agency,
564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing denied, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S.Ct. 3106 (1979) (to the same effect).
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of equal protection discussed below. However, the court "held" that there
was insufficient proof of a present intent to discriminate 6 even though the
Florida Commissioner of Education, Ralph Turlington, "acknowledged that
he had . . . anticipated a high black failure rate with regard to imple-
mentation of the SSAT II testing program," 7 as did numerous other Florida
Department of Education employees who testified. The court approved the
statement that a person is presumed to have intended the natural conse-
quences of his act, not as dispositive of the issue, but as one factor which
may be considered,'" although here it apparently was not compelling.
Even in this first category, where a prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose or intent is established by the plaintiffs, the defendants may be
able to rebut the charge by showing that the goal (of increased pro-
ficiency in basic skills) was permissible and no other method will achieve
the goal in a less discriminatory manner."
However, in the second category of equal protection claims, "the
existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an
impermissible effect.""' In the first category only purposeful "kicks" will
demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection clause; in the second cate-
gory, even unintentional discrimination will constitute a violation. "One
who is stumbled over often enough may, understandably, notice that those
cumulative impacts bear a certain functional resemblance to kicks."'""
Debra P. falls within the second category (where only discriminatory
effect need be proven) since the school system had only been integrated
since 1971.1°- The court found that "[t]he vestiges of the inferior elementary
education [the plaintiffs] . . . received are still present and affect their
performance."' 3 The functional literacy tests were administered as a re-
quirement for graduation in the 1978-79 school year.' " Due to the pur-
poseful discrimination in the recent past, the court, following Gaston County
v. United States,"' noted that even "impartial administration of the literacy
test today would serve only to perpetuate the inequities [of the past] in a
-' Debra P. v. Turlington 474 F. Supp. 244, 254 (1979).
97 Id. at 253.
98 Id.
99 Lewis, supra note 12, at 170.
100 Id. at 174-75, n.190 (quoting Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462
(1972) (emphasis added)).
101 Lewis, supra note 12, at 173. n.181 (quoting Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HRv. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977).
102 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 252 (1979).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 257.
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different form."1 ' Utilization of competency tests in a district which was
physically integrated only seven years before the introduction of the testing
may result in " 'resegregation' within the school according to test results
(or other forms of tracking) since unequal educational opportunities
may cause black children to score lower than their white counterparts.' 10 7
In Debra P. the court pointed out that ability grouping (even if it re-
sults in resegregation) may be acceptable in the future, but not until
the district has operated as a unitary system without such assignments
for a sufficient period of time to assure that the underachievement of
the slower groups is not due to yesterday's educational disparities.
Such a bar period may be lifted when the district can show that steps
taken to bring disadvantaged students to peer status have ended the
educational disadvantages caused by prior segregation.'
Here, the court found that the "black school children . . . 'still wear [the]
badge of their old deprivation-underachievement.' "109 "[R]ace more than
any other factor . . . is a predictor of success on the test." 1"0 When this
state of affairs no longer exists, "then a graduation requirement based on
a neutral test will be permitted.""'
In summary, analysis of the fourteenth amendment equal protection
claim will begin "with a determination of whether the disparities in test
results between black and white students are so substantial as to support
a finding of discriminatory effect""' 2 or of "purposeful discrimination.""'
"Plaintiffs would then have the burden of establishing a record of past
discrimination. A prior desegregation decree would, of course, provide the
clearest evidence."" ' The burden of production then shifts to the defendant
school system to show "that the effects of prior [segregation] . . . have dis-
sipated""' or that the competency program is in fact being used to remedy
the situation and equalize the students' educational opportunities.",'
In addition to their fourteenth amendment claims, the plaintiffs in
'0 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 255 (1979) (quoting Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285, 297 (1969)).
"07 McClung, supra note 20, at 688.
108 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 255 (1979) (quoting McNeal v. Tate, 508
F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1975)).
109 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 256 (1979,) (quoting McNeal v. Tate, 508
F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1975)).
1O Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 256-57 (1979).
21' Id. at 257.
112 Lewis, supra note 12, at 176.
'is Id. at 176, n. 199 (emphasis deleted) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
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Debra P. asserted that Florida's functional literacy program discriminated
against them in contravention of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.117
Their reliance on Title VI appeared to be well-placed in light of the H.E.W.
Title VI regulations which incorporate the effect standard and prohibit
school systems receiving funds from "utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina-
tion because of their race, color, or national origin." '118 "Because virtually
all public schools are subject to Title VI regulations,"'19 plaintiffs would
need only show that the tests had a discriminatory effect to be protected
by Title VI.
One caveat should, however, be noted. The United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Bakke 121 may have "undercut the effect standard
incorporated in the Title VI regulations.""' 1 According to one commentator,
Bakke provided that "Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications
that would violate the Equal Protection clause if employed by a state or its
agencies.""' Therefore, Title VI may not still have its pre-Bakke effect of
lightening the plaintiff's burden. Debra P. adds support to this theory by
lumping the plaintiff's constitutional claim together with their Title VI
claim in a one sentence determination that rights under both headings
were violated."'
The plaintiffs in Debra P. also alleged a violation of their rights under
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act which provides, in part, that
"[n]o state shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin" ' 4 and specifies the
prohibited practices. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' rights under
this act had been violated, presumably for the same reasons the court enum-
erated in its discussion of the constitutional claim. It was not the test itself
that the court objected to; it was the use of the test too soon after inte-
gration. Actually, although the court found that "some of the questions
do have factual settings unfamiliar to certain racial groups . . . this dis-
traction is minimal and unpervasive."1 5 Thus the test was not racially biased.
The court enjoined the state of Florida
from requiring passage of the SSAT II as a requirement for graduation
for a period of four (4) years. In the school term 1982-1983, the state
117 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
11845 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
119 McClung, supra note 20, at 692.
120 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
121 McClung, supra note 20, at 692.
122 Id.
123 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 257 (1979).
124 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1976), especially § 1703.
125 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 261-62 (1979).
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will be permitted to utilize the SSAT II as a requirement for graduation.
In the interim the SSAT II can be administered . . . to assist in the
identification and remediation of . . skill objectives." 8
Comprehensive as it was, the Debra P. case did not deal with all the
possible challenges to state competency testing programs. In addition to
claims based on due process and equal protection/discrimination, the
tests may, in the future, be challenged on first amendment grounds. This
class of claims has been labeled "inappropriate test content" by one com-
mentator. 127 Three subheadings will be discussed herein as each could
conceivably provide a basis for future litigation: (1) cultural bias; (2) co-
erced belief; and (3) invasion of privacy. 8
Cultural bias is commonly perceived in a test that contains some items
"that are especially more difficult for one group than another"'29 perhaps
due to their different cultural backgrounds. "A 'cultural fair' test may be
an impossible goal,""' yet two alternative solutions to the test have been
expounded.
The first is a pluralistic test which "reflects all aspects of our . . .
society . . . [and places] students at an equal advantage or disadvantage."'21
For example, "[al functional competency test given in Miami or San An-
tonio . . . should include a number of Hispanic skill and content items,
as some cross-cultural competence is arguably necessary for successful
functioning in those cities." ' 2
The other alternative is a culturally neutral test which usually means
testing on attributes of the majority culture (white middle-class). The
argument made by supporters of "culturally neutral" tests is that "success
is defined by the majority culture, and all students regardless of background
should be provided with the education and training necessary to function
effectively in our predominantly white middle-class culture."'32 The problem
with this type of test is that it tends to "exaggerate the extent of functional
12e Id. at 269.
127 McClung, supra note 20, at 672.
128 One of McClung's subheadings has already been discussed: insufficient match between
the test and the curriculum or instruction provided. See supra notes 27-32 and accompany-
ing text. One was deleted as a repetitive subheading and used as a conclusion: unteachable
or unmeasurable content. McClung, supra note 20, at 678-79.
29 McClung, supra note 20, at 694.
in Id. at 695 (citing DYER, RACE AND INTELLIGENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE SCI-NTIC
EVIDENCE BY FouR AUTHORTiEs (1963)) which states that there are only two situations in
which a competency test can be culturally fair: either everyone has to have access to the
learning necessary for the test or else no one has access to the information. Dyer maintains
that neither of these conditions is possible.
131 McClung, supra note 20, at 695.
232 ld.
183 Id. at 696.
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imcompetence among blacks and other minorities"" since, for example,
"[t]he ability to survive in a ghetto.., is not measured by the test.""'
Thus it "does not measure an individual's competence in functioning in
that part of society in which he or she lives every day.""'  Thus "it seems
clear that competency tests which are culturally biased . . . will be subject
to legal challenge.""'
The second subcategory, coerced belief, deals with the complaint that
competency test questions assume "that certain beliefs . . . are the correct
and proper ones, and that students can fail a test and be denied a high school
diploma if their answers do not conform to those officially deemed correct.""
Justice Jackson, in his famous "fixed star" comparison stated that "freedom
to differ" is an important constitutional right and that "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.' ' 9 "[TIhe constitutional infirmity of a test cannot be cured by any
consensual process such as majority vote by the legislature, school board,
parents, or students."' 40
In addition to attempting to collect information about a student's
"'deviant' attitude . . . there is the ominous prospect that . . . classes
may be created 'to remedy the problem'" and that diploma denial may
result if the student refuses to change his or her views to conform to the
views of the school board.'' It is unlikely that the schools' traditional in-
terest in first amendment cases, (maintaining discipline) will be strong
184 Id. at 696, n. 223.
15 Id.
56 Id.
137 Id. at 698. (footnotes omitted).
iss Id. at 674. For example, one question on a test given at Westside High School in Omaha,
Nebraska read: "Which of the following would you expect to find in a democratic society?"
The first item was: "Joe Smith gives voters $5 each to vote for him." Findley, Westside's
Minimum Competency Graduation Requirements: A Program That Works, 59 Pm DELTA
KAPPAN 614, 617 (May 1978). A student's answer will depend upon his interpretation of
the phrase "expect to find." If the phrase is understood to mean "might conceivably occur,"
the student would answer, correctly, that he would expect to find vote-buying in a democratic
society.
On the other hand, if the student thinks that the question means: "Which of the
following are typical characteristics of a democratic society?" the student would answer
that bribery or vote-buying is not typical, legitimate, standard practice in a democratic society.
The latter interpretation and consequent answer are, according to the official answers, in-
correct. Students certainly are not taught in class that vote-buying is acceptable behavior
in the United States' democracy, yet the student is penalized for stating that he would
not expect to find illegal activities connected with democratic elections.
139 McClung, supra note 20, at 675 (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
140 McClung, supra note 20, at 676.
141 Id. at 678.
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enough "to justify infringement upon the [student's] . . . interest in free
expression.""
The third subcategory of the inappropriate test content claim is that
the test is an invasion of privacy. In an interesting twist on the claim of
coerced belief, one author has pointed out that "[tihe student might assert
a privacy interest and simply refuse to disclose his or her opinions on [certain
items] . . . whether or not they happen to coincide with the official view."''
An additional privacy right claim might arise "if the school cannot
protect the confidentiality of the [test result] information."'" However, most
of the state competency testing statutes have a provision declaring that any
compilation of test results is not a public record within the meaning of the
state Freedom of Information Act.1"5 This is the states' attempt to defend
against this sort of claim. A complaint based on an invasion of the student's
right to privacy will still probably focus on the fact that "[tihere is too
much of a chance that the wrong people for the wrong reasons will be
singled out and counselled in the wrong manner."'"6
A totally different type of litigation which has arisen concurrently
with competency testing programs is the educational malpractice claim
based on common law negligence principles. No one seems to agree on
which came first, the testing or the lawsuits. A good number of the com-
petency testing statutes were enacted in 1977. The two principal educational
malpractice suits were decided in 1976 and 1978.' But whether the
statutes were a response to the plea of illiterate students (manifested in
their malpractice claims) for a decent education,' or the suits were first
brought in response to the enactment of the statutes (with their apparent
guarantee of an adequate education), educators have noticed that they
are in a Catch-22 situation where "they may be sued whether or not they
give a functionally illiterate student a high school diploma."'" If they refuse
to graduate the student or give him a differentiated diploma, they may
be sued on the due process and equal protection grounds discussed above,
142 Id. at 677.
143 Id. at 678. The right to privacy, although it is not found in the express words of the
Constitution, has been recognized and developed in the common law. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 152 (1973).
44 McClung, supra note 20, at 678.
245 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-157 (1980).
146Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (the court invalidated a test
designed to identify potential drug abusers on privacy grounds) quoted in McClung, supra
note 20, at 677-78.
247Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874
(1978).
148 Peter W. was initiated in 1972 and was apparently the first educational malpractice suit.
Chall, supra note 3, at 351.
249 McClung, supra note 20, at 661, n. 49.
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but if they go ahead and allow the student to graduate with a standard
diploma when he is in actuality functionally illiterate, he may sue them for
negligence and breach of their duty to educate.
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District"' "appears to have
been the first [educational] malpractice case . . . ever pursued in the
U.S.""' Peter W. was an eighteen year old who graduated from the de-
fendant school system after having attended it for twelve years. He claimed
that he had the reading ability of a fifth-grader and that the school system
had negligently failed to recognize this and take steps to correct it. 52
The plaintiff's first cause of action sounded in negligence and the
court pointed out that the elements of a negligence claim are: "(1) facts
showing a duty of care in the defendant, (2) . . . a breach of the duty,
and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a proximate result.15 The debate focused
exclusively on whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
care.' Peter W. argued that the fact that he was a public school student
was sufficient to show a duty of care on three theories.
First, that the "[a]ssumption of the function of instruction of students
imposes the duty to exercise reasonable care in its discharge."' 5 This prin-
ciple is familiar to any first year law student who has taken Torts. In
Black v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., where plaintiff
(who was intoxicated) boarded defendant's train and defendant's servants
helped him to disembark at his stop, the court, in finding that there was a
negligence issue worthy of presentation to the jury said the defandant's
servants "were under no obligation to remove him from the car, or to
provide for his safety after he left the car. But they voluntarily undertook
to help him, . . . and they were bound to use ordinary care in what they
did."15 Likewise, in a New York case where plaintiff became ill in de-
fendant's department store and defendants took plaintiff to an infirmary and
left her there, effectively isolating her from others who might have helped
her "[the] defendant assumed its duty by meddling in matters in which
legalistically it had no concern.' 5 7 "[I]f a defendant undertakes a task,
150 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976). This case was previously known as
Doe v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.
151 Chall, supra note 3, at 351.
182 60 Cal. App.3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (1976).
153 Id. at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (citing 3 WITKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE (PLEADING § 450)
2103 (2d ed. 1971)).
14 60 Cal. App.3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
155 Id.
150 193 Mass. 448, 450, 79 N.E. 797, 798 (1907).
157 Zelenko v. Gimbell Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 905, 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (Sup. Pt. 1935).
See also Hernandez v. Toney, 289 So.2d 318 (La. App. 1973) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 324 (1965).
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even if under no legal duty to undertake it, the defendant must not omit
to do what an ordinary man would do in performing the task.""' 8
These cases can certainly be analogized to the situation presented in
Peter W. where the school district undertook to educate all school age chil-
dren in the district yet failed to complete its undertaking in a satisfactory
manner. Nevertheless, the court summarily dismissed the first part of Peter
W.'s claim citing "want of relevant authority."'' 9
Plaintiff's second theory upon which he based his negligence claim
was that "[t]here is a special relationship between students and teachers
which supports [the teachers'] duty to exercise reasonable care."'' The
court dismissed this contention and plaintiff's third theory (which was basic-
ally the same) with very little discussion.
In short, plaintiff's common law negligence claim was dismissed for
reasons of public policy and "[f]or want of relevant authority,"'' although
the court did recognize that new areas of tort liability may open up if
they are "comprehensible and assessable within the existing judicial frame-
work.",6 -
The court acknowledged that the general rule is that "[a]U persons
are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the
result of their conduct"'' " but noted that a departure from this rule is per-
missible when the departure is "clearly supported by public policy.'
'16 4
After weighing many factors which are pertinent to a decision on whether
or not public policy favors "judicial recognition of [a] . . . duty in the
defendant,"1 '5 including
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, thee policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with the resulting
liability for breach. . . . the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved
259 Zelenko v. Gimbell Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 905, 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
159 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 858.
1601d. at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
162 Id. at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
62 Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
1631d. at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112,
443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968), paraphrasing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714
(West Supp. 1981)).
2e4 Id.
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.. . the possibility of 'feigned claims,' and the difficulty of
[proving]. . a particular injury,'
the court concluded that the burden to the public of recognizing such a
duty of care in the schools outweighed the plaintiff's individual interest.
Thus the court found that, for reasons of public policy, there was no
duty of care owed to the plaintiff, so his negligence claim failed.'67
The plaintiff advanced two additional claims which were based on
theories other than negligence. The first was the district's alleged breach
of a mandatory (statutory) duty under code sections which, according
to plaintiff, provide inter alia that the district should keep parents advised
of the student's educational progress (or lack thereof),"68 instruct students
"in the basic skills of reading and writing,"'6 9 and "not . . . graduate
students from high school without demonstration of proficiency in basic
skills."17 The court held that these statutes were not "designed to protect
against the risk of a particular kind of injury . . . . [In other words, they
are] administrative but not protective. Their violation accordingly imposes
no liability"'' in this situation.
The plaintiff's only remaining cause of action was based on misrepre-
sentation, both negligent and intentional, since the school allegedly "repre-
sented to plaintiff's mother . . . that plaintiff was performing at or near
grade level in [the] basic academic skills."'7 The court held that for the
same public policy reasons reviewed above, the plaintiff had not presented
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation."8 Furthermore, since
the plaintiff did not allege "the requisite element of reliance upon the 'mis-
representation',"'' no cause of action for intentional misrepresentation was
stated. Therefore, the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs complaint was
affirmed.
A New York case decided in 1978, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
166id. at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 (footnotes omitted).
le7Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
168 id. at 826, n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862, n.5. Plaintiff cites CAL. Enuc. CODE and Title 5 of
the CALIFORNA ADMINSTRATIVE CODE. (CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51216 (West. Supp. 1981) pro-
vides that when a student "does not demonstrate sufficient progress towards mastery of
basic skills," the principal shall arrange a conference with the student's parents. No section
more precisely supporting the plaintiff's assertion was found.)
18960 Cal. App.3d at 826, n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862, n.5. Plaintiff cites "the Constitution
and laws of the State of California."
17, 60 Cal. App.3d at 826, n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.5. Plaintiff cites CAL. Enuc. CODE §
8573 et. seq. (current version at CAL. Enuc. CODE § 51225 (1978)).
'7'60 Cal. App.3d 814, 826-27 (1976). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980)
quoted in 60 Cal. App.3d at 826, n.6, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862, n.6.
17260 Cal. App.3d at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
11d.
1741 d. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (emphasis in original).
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School District'l7 presented facts, claims, a result, and an opinion remarkably
similar to the Peter W. case as well as quoting from it extensively; thus
it will not be discussed in detail herein. The New York Court did, however,
raise several new points relative to educational malpractice claims.
First, the court held that their determination that no duty was owed
to the plaintiff
[did] not mean that educators are not ethically and legally responsible
for providing a meaningful public education. . . . Quite the contrary,
all . . . officials of our schools bear an important public trust and may
be held to answer for the failure to faithfully perform their duties. It
does mean, however, that they may not be sued for damages by an
individual student."7
Furthermore, the court advanced the opinion that "[it simply is not
within the judicial function to evaluate conflicting theories of how best
to educate.' ' 77
Although the court in Peter W. did not reach the second and third
elements of a cause of action in negligence because it found that the first
element, (duty of care) was not shown, in Donohue the court stated:
the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because of the practical
impossibility of demonstrating that a breach of the alleged . . . duties
was the proximate cause of his failure to learn. . . . It is not alleged
that the plaintiff's classmates, who were exposed to the identical
classroom instruction, also failed to learn. From this it may reasonably
be inferred that the plaintiff's illiteracy resulted from other causes."'
Finally the court made note of the fact that plaintiff did not advance
a claim based on misrepresentation"' so it is reasonable to assume that the
next educational malpractice case that is filed will test a cause of action
based on intentional misrepresentation and that the plaintiff, unlike Peter
W., will remember to allege reliance.
Since the two educational malpractice suits discussed herein were
brought in New York,' and California,' and the pre-eminent due pro-
cess and equal protection case in the competency testing area was brought
in Florida," 2 and these three states are generally considered to be the most
17564 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
IS ld. at 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
'IT Id. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for one explanation of why the court
may get involved when competency tests are at issue.
178 Id. at 39, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
170 ld.
'
8 0 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
a19 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1976).182 Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (1979).
[Vol. Is:I
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/6
progressive trendsetters in developing new legal theories and causes of action,
these cases may be just a hint (or a threat) of what is to come.
As discussed herein, there are numerous advantages and comparable
disadvantages to testing for minimum competency. "Whatever one's personal
views, the movement is so strong that few . . . schools in this country
are likely to be untouched by its impact."18
One caveat may be appropriate. "The word 'minimum' emphasizes that
some students will be at a minimum expectation level upon graduation. It
does not guarantee that students will be proficient at [the basic skills]."'"
Being at the minimum level, yet "competent" is, of course, better than
being illiterate; but no minimum competency testing statute should, in and
of itself, be viewed as a miraculous solution to the many problems facing
today's schools. If anything, enacting such a statute is likely to create some
brand new problems that someone is going to have to solve. Yet if a mini-
mum competency testing program does help students to attain literacy, it
will be worth the cost.
DIANNE L. Goss
%as McClung, supra note 20, at 653.
184 Findley, supra note 138, at 618.
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Appendix B







26% 3% 11% 1% 22% 5%
Percent 1977 1978 1978










77% 24% 60% 17% 46% 20%
Percent 1977 1978 1978
1Ith Graders 11th Graders 12th Graderst
Black Students
White Students
*Statistics found in Turlington, Good News from Florida: Our Minimum Competency Pro-
gram is Working, 60 Phi Delta Kappan, 649, 650 (May 1979). Turlington was the Com-
missioner of Education for the State of Florida..
tTwelfth graders were either retaking the test after having failed it in 1977, or were new
to the school system.
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